Lotus v. Borland: Defining the Limits of Software Copyright Protection by Whong, Jason A. & Lee, Andrew T. S.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 12 | Issue 1 Article 7
January 1996
Lotus v. Borland: Defining the Limits of Software
Copyright Protection
Jason A. Whong
Andrew T. S. Lee
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Jason A. Whong and Andrew T. S. Lee, Lotus v. Borland: Defining the Limits of Software Copyright Protection, 12 Santa Clara High
Tech. L.J. 207 (1996).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol12/iss1/7
CASENOTE
LOTUS V. BORLAND: DEFINING THE LIMITS OF
SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION Lotus Development
Corporation v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.
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"[E]verything ... has been done already ... who are we to improve
upon them? We can only attempt, respectfally, to repeat."'
INTRODUCTION
On January 16, 1996, only eight days after hearing oral argu-
ments in the case, an equally divided2 Supreme Court let stand the
First Circuit's decision in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Inter-
* Copyright @ 1995 Jason A. Whong and Andrew T.S. Lee.
t B.S., San Jose State University, 1991; Candidate, J.D., Santa Clara University School
of Law, 1966.
t B.A., Golden Gate University, San Francisco, 1991; Candidate, J.D., Santa Clara Uni-
versity School of Law, 1966.
1. AYN RAND, Tm FouNrTAnqEAD 23 (1943).
2. Justice John Paul Stevens recused himself from the decision for an undisclosed reason.
Paul M. Barrett, Justices Affirm Borland's Victory in Copyright Dispute with Lotus, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 17, 1996, at B2. While Justice Stevens would not reveal why he recused himself, he has a
recent pattern of recusing himself in IBM-related cases. Lotus was bought by IBM last year.
Justice Stevens' financial disclosure reports indicate no ownership of IBM stock, but some spec-
ulate that a close relative of his works for IBM. Tony Mauro, The Court Speaks in Cyberspace,
Co~n. L. TRm., Feb. 5, 1996, at 14. It was also reported that a source close to the proceedings
said Justice Stevens recused himself because he owns stock in IBM. David Einstein, Borland
Bests Lotus in 6-Year Legal Battle, S.F. CHRoN., Jan. 17, 1996.
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national, Inc. The practical effect of the Court's 4-4per curiam deci-
sion4 is to let stand the First Circuit's finding that the menu hierarchy
of a leading spreadsheet program amounts to an uncopyrightable
"method of operation," despite expressive elements contained it its ar-
rangement and structure.5 The treatment by the Court may result in
"forum shopping" as plaintiffs situated similarly to Lotus seek to
avoid the First Circuit.6  Conversely, the choice of the Court to not
offer an accompanying written opinion also strengthens the lower
court's characterization of Borland as a matter of first impression, as
well, as its determination not to follow standards for protection previ-
ously articulated by other circuits.7
In Lotus v. Borland, the First Circuit validated appellant Bor-
land's contention that it had "lawfully copied" unprotectable aspects
of Lotus' popular spreadsheet program for use in a similar product.'
By ruling in Borland's favor, the court provided remaining circuits
with a significantly narrowed view of what constitutes protectable ex-
pression and may have affirmatively exposed the limitations of ex-
isting copyright law in the context of computer software programs. 9
At issue was whether Borland infringed Lotus' copyright when it
duplicated the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy for use in its
Quattro and Quattro Pro'" spreadsheet programs." The First Circuit
3. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'dpercuriam, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 470 (Jan. 16, 1996).
4. Counsel in the case speculated based on questions presented during oral arguments that
Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas sided with Borland while Justices Ginsberg,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist sided with Lotus. The unauthored per curiam
decision did not disclose the disposition of the Justices in the case. Mark Walsh, Deadlocked
Supreme Court Affirms Borland Victory, REcoRDER, Jan. 17, 1996, at 18.
5. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 811.
6. The Court's ruling in Borland is not binding beyond the First Circuit. Walsh, supra
note 4, at 18.
7. The Borland court reviewed the leading authority from other circuits, principally the
Second Circuit decision in Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir.
1992), which articulated a complex methodology for determining infringement of the code and
structure of computer programs. Because Borland involved the literal copying of a menu hierar-
chy, however, the court rejected its applicability. The First Circuit agreed that the test set forth
in Altai would have been appropriate had the case involved the nonliteral copying of the Lotus I -
2-3 computer code. Lotus, 49, F.3d at 815.
8. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815 (emphasis added).
9. The inadequacy of copyright protection for computer software was articulated by the
concurring opinion in Borland: "The computer program is a means for causing something to
happen; it has mechanical utility, an instrumental role, in accomplishing the world's work.
Granting protection, in order words, can have some of the consequences ofpatent protection in
limiting other people's ability to perform a task in the most efficient manner. Utility does not bar
copyright (dictionaries may be copyrighted), but it alters the calculus." Id. at 819 (emphasis in
original).
10. The terms "Quattro" and "Quattro Pro" will be used interchangeably throughout the
text to refer to the Borland computer spreadsheet program.
11. 49 F.3d at 810.
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ultimately answered this question in the negative.1 2 Without explicitly
rejecting the district court's conclusion that Lotus engaged in expres-
sive choices13 in the selection of its command terms, the Borland
court held that the disputed structure was a means by which the pro-
gram functioned and was therefore an uncopyrightable "method of op-
eration" under § 102(b) of the Copyright Act. 4
BACKGROUND
Lotus 1-2-3 is a computer spreadsheet program that enables users
to perform complex accounting functions.15 The program's 469 com-
mands are operated through an innovative menu tree hierarchy.16 Lo-
tus 1-2-3 also possesses the capability to create macros. 7 A macro is
a simple procedure created by the user to replace what would other-
wise be a lengthy series of keystrokes. Macros significantly reduce
the time required to operate the program.'" These features helped Lo-
tus dominate the spreadsheet market throughout the early 1980's.9
Borland released its first Quattro spreadsheet program in 1987.
Quattro Pro users could choose to either use menu commands
designed by Borland or activate the Lotus Emulation Interface that
adopted 1-2-3's menu hierarchy.2" Quattro Pro also had the capability
of translating and using macros created for 1-2-3 through a device
known as the "Key Reader."21
In 1990 Lotus sued Borland for copyright infringement in the
United States District Court of Massachusetts.2" In a motion for sum-
mary judgment, Borland admitted copying the Lotus command struc-
ture but contended that the 1-2-3 menus were not copyrightable23 and
that "no reasonable trier of fact could find that the similarity between
its products and Lotus 1-2-3 was sufficient to sustain a determination
12. Id. at 815.
13. "Because so many variations were possible, the district court concluded that the Lotus
developer's choice and arrangement of command terms, reflected in the Lotus menu command
hierarchy, constituted copyrightable expression." Id. at 811.
14. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id. at
815 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988)).
15. Id. at 809.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 809-10.
19. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821.
20. Id. at 810.
21. Id. at 811.
22. Id. at 810.
23. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810.
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of infringement."24 In response, Lotus alleged that Borland had essen-
tially duplicated its entire user interface, thereby violating its 1-2-3
copyright.25
On July 31, 1992, presiding Judge Robert Keeton granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Lotus, holding that the company's se-
lection and placement of command terms amounted to copyrightable
expression," The district court found Lotus' argument strengthened
by the fact that Borland had created its own command structure for the
Quattro program but included the 1-2-3 structure as an alternative,
presumably to attract users already familiar with the Lotus menu
hierarchy.27
Although the court determined that the Quattro and Quattro Pro
programs had indeed infringed Lotus' copyright, it concluded that
Borland had not copied the entire 1-2-3 interface, as Lotus con-
tended.2" Consistent with this finding, the court determined that a jury
trial was necessary to assess the actual scope of Borland's
infringement. 29
As a result of the district court's ruling, Borland removed the
Lotus Emulation Interface from its programs.3 0 Consequently, Bor-
land spreadsheet users could no longer display 1-2-3 commands to
operate the Quattro program. 31 However, despite the removal of the
interface, the Quattro programs were still partially compatible with the
1-2-3 program through the "Key Reader." 32 Once activated by the
user, the Key Reader enabled Borland's programs to recognize and
perform some of the 1-2-3 macros? 3 With the Key Reader function,
the Borland programs, using Quattro Pro menus for display and inter-
action, were able to translate the Lotus macros.34 Thus, users who
wrote or purchased macros for Lotus 1-2-3 were able to utilize the
same commands in the Borland programs.35 The district court subse-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 811.
27. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810-12.
28. Id. at 811.
29. Id.
30. The Lotus Emulation Interface function allowed Quattro users to access the 1-2-3
menu command hierarchy. Id. at 811.
31. "As a result, Borland users could no longer communicate with Borland's programs as
if they were using a more sophisticated version of Lotus 1-2-3." Lotus, 49 F.3d at 811.
32. Id.
33. "Because Borland programs could no longer display the Lotus menu command hierar-
chy to users, the Key Reader did not allow debugging or modification of macros, nor did it
permit the execution of most interactive macros." Id. at 811, n.3.
34. Id. at 811-12.
35. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 812.
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quently allowed Lotus to file a supplemental complaint stating that
Borland's use of the Key Reader function to access 1-2-3 macro com-
mands constituted infringement.3 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed
the district court's decision.37 In a controversial opinion written by
Judge Stahl, the court held that the 1-2-3 menu command structure
was not copyrightable because it was a method of operation under 17
U.S.C. § 102(b). 38 The court further ruled that Borland's use of the 1-
2-3 macros was proper, finding that Lotus' argument would require
users of multiple programs to learn how to perform the same function
in several ways. 39 The court stated that this result fundamentally con-
tradicted Congressional intent underlying § 102(b) of the Copyright
Act.40
DISCUSSION
A. Method of Operation
Lotus was understandably upset by Borland's actions. The 1-2-3
command structure had become the industry standard for electronic
spreadsheet programs.4 Lotus spent large sums of money developing
1-2-3 and did not want competitors to benefit from its research and
development.42 However, awarding copyright protection to Lotus
36. After the parties agreed to try the remaining issues without a jury, the district court
held two separate trials. The Phase I trial covered all remaining issues in the original complaint
(relating to the Emulation Interface function). The Phase II trial covered issues raised in Lotus'
supplemental complaint (those relating to the Key Reader function). At the close of the Phase I
trial, Borland amended its answer to include a defense of "fair use." Because Borland had
presented all of the evidence supporting its fair use claim at the Phase I portion of the trial, but
Lotus had not presented any rebuttable evidence on fair use (because the defense had not been
raised before the conclusion of the Phase I trial), the court considered Lotus' motion for judg-
ment on partial findings of fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c). The court subsequently held that
Borland had failed to show that its use of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command hierarchy in its Emula-
tion Interface was a fair use. 49 F.3d at 812.
37. 49 F.3d at 819.
38. Id. at 815.
39. "[I]f the user wanted the computer to print material, then the user would have to learn
not just one method of operating the computer such that it prints, but many different methods.
Wefind this absurd." Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818 (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. "Apparently, for a period Lotus 1-2-3 has had such sway in the market that it has
represented the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet commands." Id at 821 (Boudin,
Circuit Judge, concurring).
42. In its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Lotus con-
tends that its founder, Mitchell Kapor, "spent hundreds of hours" developing menus in the 1-2-3
menu hierarchical structure:
Because there was no precedent for the menu structure we envisioned, we had no
formal market research or other data to guide us in making these determinations.
We did, however, conduct a number of informal user tests both internally at Lotus
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could have given it a monopoly over the' spreadsheet market. Users
would not be willing to switch to rival platforms, even if technologi-
cally superior, because they would have to learn new commands.43
The First Circuit denied Lotus copyright protection ruling that the
1-2-3 command hierarchy was a method of operation.' The first step
in analyzing the First Circuit's decision is to determine whether 1-2-
3's menu hierarchy and macro commands constitute a method of oper-
ation under § 102(b).45 According to the court, a method of operation
refers to the "means by which a person operates something, whether it
be a car, a food processor, or a computer." 46 The court cited an in-
struction manual as an example by stating that the text describing how
to operate something does not extend copyright protection to the oper-
ation itself.47 Another individual should be able to employ that
method and explain it in their own words.48
The First Circuit concluded that 1-2-3's menu and macro struc-
tures are methods of operation by stating:
The Lotus menu command hierarchy provides the means by which
users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3 .... Users must use the
command terms to tell the computer what to do. Without the menu
command hierarchy, users would not be able to access and control,
or indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3's fimctional capabilities.49
The First Circuit compared 1-2-3's menu hierarchy with buttons
used to operate a video cassette recorder ("VCR").50 Viewers press a
series of buttons that are typically labeled "Record, Play, Reverse,
Stop/Eject" in order to operate a VCR.51 The arrangement of the but-
tons is not copyrightable expression because they are required to con-
trol the machine.52 As with VCR's, users press keys to run 1-2-3's
commands.53 However, without the Lotus hierarchy, users cannot run
as well as outside the company. In the end, the menu tree organization was based
largely on my intuition and subjective judgment, informed by feedback from the
user tests, trying as best I could to imagine myself in the [role] of a typical user.
Appendix to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 292a, Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d (st Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3199, 116 S.Ct. 39 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 94-2003).
43. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 820.'
44. Id. at 815.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See supra note 14.
46. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 817.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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1-2-3.14 Unlike labels on VCR buttons, 1-2-3's menu strjlcture is es-
sential to running the program.5  A spreadsheet without 1-2-3's com-
mand structure is like a buttonless VCR.5 6 Both are inoperable and
thereby useless.
Based on the VCR analogy, the court noted that 1-2-3's menu
command hierarchy did not merely explain and present the program's
functional capabilities; it was how users communicated with the sys-
tem. 7 Quite simply, the Lotus command structure was the means by
which users operated the program. 8 The court explained: "If specific
words are essential to operate something, then they are part of a
'method of operation' and, as such, are unprotectable. ' 59 Although
Borland programmers could have designed Quattro Pro's commands
differently, it was not relevant in determining whether the Lotus menu
hierarchy was a method of operation.60 In short, the fact that there are
numerous ways to operate a computer program, does not make the
actual method of operation chosen copyrightable. 61 In addition, the
First Circuit rejected the district court's finding that theLotus menu
structure was copyrightable expression.6 - The fact that Lotus selected
and arranged its commands did "not magically change the un-
copyrightable menu command hierarchy into copyrightable subject
matter.
63
54. "The Lotus menu commands are essential to operating Lotus 1-2-3." Lotus, 49 F.3d at
817.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Borland presents an excellent analogy in the conclusion of its Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court:
Twenty years ago, the first personal computers had no screens or keyboards; the
users operated the machines by pressing buttons or switches on the front of the
machines. No one would ever claim that such buttons were copyrightable.
Twenty years from now, users will operate personal computers with spoken
words, and without any physical buttons or keyboards. It is inconceivable that
anyone could claim that such spoken methods of operation will be copyrightable.
At the intermediate stage of technology relevant here, Lotus used typed words as
the buttons or switches to operate its spreadsheet program. Those words are no
more copyrightable than physical buttons were twenty years ago, or than spoken
commands will be twenty years from now.
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 28, Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d (1st Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W. 3199, 116 S.Ct. 39 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 94-2003).
58. Lotus, 49 F.3d. at 815.
59. Id. at 816.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 818.
62. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 811.
63. Id. at 816.
19961
COMPUTER & HGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Regarding the issue of macro compatibility, the First Circuit for-
warded an even stronger statement. 4 The fact that various computer
programs offer different ways of writing macros is of little conse-
quence in determining protectability because the end result, the macro
itself, is the user's own work product.65 Forcing users to rewrite their
macros challenges the fundamental underpinnings of § 102(b).16 The
menu hierarchy of Lotus 1-2-3 and its macro structure functioned as a
method of operation and was, therefore, uncopyrightable.67 The First
Circuit also analyzed Baker v. Selden in which the Supreme Court
held that the utility the public derives from a product is not copyright-
able.68 Lotus wrote its menu hierarchy for individuals to learn and use
its product.69  The court, therefore, reasoned that Lotus should be
barred from essentially copyrighting the expertise that users acquired
from learning the 1-2-3 command structure.7
0
In his concurring opinion, Judge Boudin reemphasized the impor-
tance of the user in terms of economic and policy considerations.7'
Unlike traditional areas of copyright law such as literary works,
novels, plays, and films, computer programs have a utilitarian na-
ture.72 Computer programs are a means to complete a task.73 Grant-
ing copyright protection for utilitarian items can limit "other people's
ability to perform a task in the most efficient manner." 74 As a policy
concern, granting protection in this area may be more harmful to soci-
ety than denying it.75
Judge Boudin then acknowledged that although computer menus
may be creative work, over time their importance resides more in the
64. Id. at 818.
65. Id.
66. This is especially critical to users who have invested a great deal of time and energy
creating macros that may exceed 1,000 commands. Id. at 818.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 817 (referring to Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)).
69. Id.
70. Although the First Circuit found Borland's argument strengthened by the seemingly
utilitarian holding of Baker, it firmly rejected Borland's contention that the cases were identical:
We do not think that Baker v. Selden is nearly as analogous to this appeal as
Borland claims. Of course, Lotus 1-2-3 is a computer spreadsheet, and as such its
grid of horizontal rows and vertical columns certainly resembles an accounting
ledger or any other paper spreadsheet. Those grids, however, are not at issue in
this appeal, for, unlike Baker, Lotus does not claim to have monopoly over its
accounting system.
Id. at 814.
71. Id. at 819-22.
72. Id. at 819.
73. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 819.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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investment made by users in learning the menu and building their own
macros than in reliance on the program's structure.7 6 He also noted
that menu structures have a functional purpose and the menu itself has
little value without people relying on it. Judge Boudin observed that
"the purpose of the menu is not to be admired as a work of literary or
pictorial art."77 He also emphasized that "[t]he menu commands (e.g.,
'print,' 'quit') are largely for standard procedures that Lotus did not
invent and are common words that Lotus cannot monopolize."7"
Therefore, they are best defined as methods of operation.79
B. Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.
In its analysis of the facts underlying Borland, the First Circuit
rejected the applicability of the test developed by the Second Circuit's
decision in Computer Assoc. Int'l, In.c v. Altai, Inc.,80 a leading case
in computer software protection. Altai is especially notable because it
articulates a thoughtful, though complex, methodology for assessing
the proper level of protection for a program's "non-literal" elements.8"
The First Circuit's decision not to apply Altai also illustrated what the
court viewed to be the critical issue in the case, namely, whether a
menu hierarchy is afforded any protection under copyright law.
The Altai court developed a three-part analysis for determining
whether copyright infringement had occurred through the nonliteral
copying of a protected computer program.8 2 Instances of nonliteral
copying arise when the concepts underlying a protected program,
which are copyrighted as literary work, are reproduced in a manner
that paraphrases the original work rather than copying it outright or
literally duplicating it.83 The Second Circuit employed its analysis to
ascertain whether one program's nonliteral expression was improperly
obtained from another program's underlying code.
When faced with instances of alleged nonliteral copying, the
court examining the facts must determine if similarities between the
76. It appears that as the 1-2-3 menu structure became the industry standard, its level of
copyright protection diminished. Id
77. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 821.
78. If Lotus is allowed to retain complete control over its 1-2-3 command structure, users
who have learned the system would be confined to use Lotus products. While this may be
appropriate if 1-2-3 is the superior product, a problem exists when superior electronic spread-
sheet programs are created. Id. at 821.
79. Id.
80. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
81. The term "non-literal" in the Altai context refers to aspect of a computer program that
has not been reduced to computer code. Id. at 696.
82. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 814.
83. Id.
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programs are due merely to the sharing of a common, unprotectable
idea or whether actual infringement of protected expression has oc-
curred.8 4 An Altai analysis, therefore, requires a court to dissect a
disputed program and then separate protectable expression from un-
protectable ideas."5
The Altai test consists of an abstraction, filtration, and compari-
son phase in which elements of the program are broken down and
examined. 6 The abstraction phase allows the court to identify the
appropriate framework in which to isolate idea from expression. 7
The next phase involves "filtration," in which the court scrutinizes
each element of the protected work to "filter" aspects of the program
that were included because of function, efficiency or standard treat-
ment of the subject.88 In the final phase, the court compares elements
of the work that survive the filtration process to corresponding ele-
ments contained in the allegedly infringing work to determine whether
a finding of infringement is justified. 9 The Second Circuit concluded
that infringement would be found only if substantial similarity existed
in those aspects of the protected program that were not dictated by
efficiency, external factors, or taken from the public domain. 90
While the court acknowledged that an Altai analysis would be
applicable had the facts involved the nonliteral reproduction of the
computer codes underlying the 1-2-3 program, it noted that Borland
involved literal duplication and that the application of Altai would
serve to confuse the fundamental issue of whether the Lotus menu
hierarchy could be protected at all.91
CONCLUSION
Legal analysis of software copyright is anything but simplistic.
However, arguments advocating more or less protection typically turn
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 814.
87. Id.
88. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 16, Lotus v. Borland, cert. granted, 64 U.S.L.W.
3199, 116 S.Ct. 39 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1995) (No. 94-2003).
89. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 814.
90. In short, the Second Circuit established a filtering process which eliminates efficiency,
objective needs, and common practices to determine if what remained was copyrightable. See
HoWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH F. ENAYATI, IP STRATEoY: COMPLETE INTELLICTUAL
PROPERTY PLA.N1No, AccESS AN PROTECTIoN (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 25, on file
with authors).
91. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 815.
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on the perceived economic consequences of granting either wider ac-
cess or affording greater enforcement of ownership. 92
Borland illustrates the difficult balance that the courts must strike
between overprotection and access. Indeed, the innovation and entre-
preneurship responsible for products, such as Lotus 1-2-3 or Borland's
Quattro programs, may be creating something of a turmoil in the
courts as to the proper amount of legal protection for computer
software. 93 The judiciary is increasingly being placed in the unenvi-
able position of upholding or discarding a specific copyright based on
their interpretation of the law, while at the same time remaining im-
partial to the potential effect their decision will have on business and
the innovation of future products.
Depending on one's view, the Borland decision could either re-
sult in greater technological innovation or a relative stagnation caused
by the belief that copyright law is insufficient for the protection of
software.9 4 However, despite speculation on Borland's ultimate im-
pact, the powerful economic incentives that have resulted in high tech-
nology's phenomenal growth will most likely continue to drive
innovative efforts regardless of the degree of protection afforded by
the courts.
92. See, e.g., Lee T. Gesmer, Implications of Lotus v. Borland Decision, MASS. LAw.
WYY., May 1, 1995, at B4.
93. This apparent conflict is illustrated by the Borland court's criticism over the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Autoskill, Inc. v. National Education Support Systems, Inc., 944 F.2d 1476
(10th Cir. 1993). Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818-19.
94. Gesmer, supra note 92.
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